


3 Hypo "Miss Det" does give some Type II (see HCB)
 - enough for Europe! (Expirated) "

To go for now - or for LSR -
 is really for ME + TW - even




Q: Have you shown restraint on testing /
producing new weapons? (Srooke: yes (intuiting))
 in hopes of detente
 (e.g. did they hold off installing SS-18 / mod 4?)

Srooke: not an SS-16-20, but later generation.

Q: Did McN show restraint?

[McN could have backed ABM war: NIKE-X, etc.
 But give numbers of low missiles...

2)
 Tendency to believe we're not "doing anything" when
 we "silly modernize" (MIRV, Mk-12A...
 and don't introduce a whole new system
 i.e. self-deception (Brown): "We're not
pushing the hows....) ("We don't build, they build...")



(John Harris)

SU CF - What makes alleged SU intent in

"war-fight", CF, winning "relevant & credible" now
(since 73-75) is meant SU advance into land-target kill cap:

MIIRV, accuracy (CO, as defender; "offensive" non-mv cap,
force projection)

[Do note the innovation in SU cap.

i.e. imitation of US cap. [WHY? AND WHY WARSAW PACT
BUILDUP? Satellite unrest?]

[dist. (US!) declaratory, force planning, & use/operational
doctrine & planning.

see final. [Hands have always feared SU total cap, even
from 8 worse, partly (including CF, D-C); but warned of
herity! SU CF/FS cap, "superiority."

("possible" SU H: 1950. Tanks, bombers, air defense;
missiles; ABM; large warhead - SS-9 - "FS" - 1969;
MIIRV; CO....)

[to describe US vision on Sup, CF, FS/FU threats,
global sphere - "responsibility" to maintain
a global - "adventurism", unjust, foreign-imposed,
- status quo, by covert / military / subversive initiatives
of CR.

US policy does contemplate "offensive" military ops (to back
up covert ops; usually to "defend status quo": but that's not the idea,
VN, Laos,

US FU Threats: not "offensive" but "defensive": to prevent
(a tactical) defeat (and see NATO plans).

or to break a deadlock ...

10,000 miles from home!

Analysis only of First Phase of CW Thinking
was so brief:

- Affected previous belief - arrival of Paris,
mutual deterrence (SU retal. cap.):

1957-1961.

"Answers: 1) - he was wrong (Dain, Teller (Oppie?!), Cohen, NAIC)

2) - he stated retal (Kneen, Schles, ... HK...)

3) - FS, at joint effort: CD, ABM... HK, Kaufman, Parrish...

4) - non-nuc defense (OSD: Hitch? Enten, DE, Kaufman...)

- Then, discovery of US monopoly; + Berlin Crisis (the,
Cuba II...). Futhmore; also, desire to control French nucs,
by 3 or 2.

- Then; ~~USAF~~ realization: monopoly is so complete, no
need for buildup (and USAF overplays its hand):
whereas, SU is soon to build up retal. cap.

(without matching), negates 3

McN's best is to rely on 4, reject 1

- Schles doesn't believe in 3, but wants 2

Phase II of CW!^{FS}

- after VN

- after Shock

- result of TW, ordered by SU

- new tech appearing ~~massive~~

The act. USG thought obtained in 1957-61 has now arrived.

Arms Control

Kake Nijon in 1969 with 550,000 troops to "withdraw" (gradually) — each PRC inherits a vast surplus of weapons to "throw into the sled" to the back of disarming mippy at his heels — ^{an} endless supply of "lesser evils — improvements" with which to placate, defend, postpone & confuse demands for a reduced and eliminated danger of nuclear war — and to policies that maintain and appear to increase sharply in crisis the risk of US-initiated nuclear war.

lack of good
presumption cap.
by US

AND OF "SUPER-DET" WRT US
A USE OF SU'S CF/PREEMPTIVE
not available before 1982, SS-B mod 4
"1" for SU "D. J. J. J."

Thoughts 30 Nov 82

ANDROPOV

Warning by ~~US~~ - A NUCLEAR THREAT (OF PREEMPTIVE)
- "IF P/CM GOES IN" [OR] [in crisis] (nearly)

1. Might SU go to LOW?

"I don't trust the not to."

"We did, ..."

- When we recognized possibility of

- de-connection

or "decapitation"

(1955? Rombing)

We went to Delegation:

Rules:

1) Outage of com with Pres / Wash
(= condition for going on LOW)

2) "Reason to believe..."

≈ LOW

Thus, the only "machines"
involved is intelligence to
consider (perhaps for)

prompting in major crisis

(CW, etc, areas, US-SU involved)
"seeing an advantage" [like did, like
knowing (CB) ≈ Malmgren!]

[3] In crisis: but if with side is
expected to choose preemptive war
(despite advantages, + some advantages,
+ some serious discussion of leaders:

Khrushchev 195-; US vs China, 1964;

SU vs. China, 1969, 1978? (if China are
Chinese!)

then a combination of
(Preemptive Cap. on both sides, + CW + Esc) is needed
First move: troops on spot. ("Why should we be the one to back off?")

Instability - can be affected by furies, payoffs;

Risk/needlessness ≠ "machines"
in public mind. ("Maybe he knows
something.")

or expectations, model
behaviors,
(threats),
noise

Set up our own own
humiliation, rage →
revenge, needlessness...

interesting, or "machines" risk...
(2-sides)

Downside + LOW

Modern strategy: if all you have is a Dumb Machine...

LOW / Delegation

SU Out in East ≈ US elsewhere

Status zero - ending

"Primer / benefit of
Empire; Basis #1
Barbaric Morality

(if it maintains preemptive threat
(SU: use Evn only, till mid-60's;
still, SU basis for hope in deterring attack
on SU (1) 1964-82 - (till MX/MX

Other "F1

No. of FS warheads

3d type of overall:
Chernom: War is Hell,
then or prevent "forgetful"

So D-L versus Deterrence.

1) Shrotes

Proposition —
Never

Invites Proposition

2) Encourages FU thats

for 18 83

(+ intention by
threatening escalation)

for 1983

Hypo: Any strategy or system that
improves "2d strike D-L" will
work better in a FS (or protection);
and will probably make a bigger
difference. Kramer

— This applies to any "coercive strategy"
— designed before 1961 Berlin thats,
(+ before Bg of Pigs), and during "Missile Exp."
i.e. I want it for "2d-strike
D-L for both sides, not war-ending";
but to "sell" it, I should not rule out
opposition to FS or protection;
for which it became the only "national"
strategy, once SU original signable forces,
esp. hardened.

With SU CF, it could be attributed
to SU (1976-77: CPD) ≡, with US agreed
to intell; but real and was to have some
basis for a threat to escalate: which SU CF +

"Coercive strategy" made "credible" by
sincere a SU threat to protest (or
escalate) and/or both these elements:
plus a credible threat of US escalation
or punishment.

"Moral" FS Plans

(Nitz, 1956. Entdown. Ramm, 1961...)

— like throwing a notch, carefully, into
a powder-room.

—
Nor are there mere posturing, ^{bluffs,} ^{to}
cause fear & caution in enemy —
with no intent, readiness or likelihood
of coming the out.

To make the credible enough,
actions are taken — including the
forgoing of alternatives — that make it
difficult to refrain from coming the
out if the enemy fails to back down.

And the recent history of every war
in the world since in the last decade
reminds one after case of opponents who
did not back down as they were expected
to do by their stronger attackers: VN, ^(US) Cambodia,
VN (China), Afghanistan, Iran ^(US), Iran (Iraq), Uganda
(Tanzania)

5 Jan 83

FS/FU / Preemption

If you are worried mainly about one way occurring,

then if preemptive cap./risk increases — on either of both sides — one should be less willing to ~~allow~~ initiate FU.

But ~~the~~ if ^(US) ~~preemptive~~ aim is to make FU that credible by deterring SU retal. - i - kind, or SU escalation, then an increase in US out^{low} i SU preemptive cap. is desirable; by increasing credibility that SU retal / esc will lead to US preemption.

(If SU preemptive cap. is high, then US might be deterred from responding to SU retal. with escalation that is short of preemption.

discuss,

[Each does some the other can & will calculate 2-4 rows ahead, like chess or checkers.]

just as Services "game" against Congress...

(Vs. mobile MM — over-estimating its costs,
~~under-estimating~~
making (low) time gain...

Vs. smaller MX (fit into Trident tubes)

Vs. C-4 missile for Poseidon tubes — tell Trident program approved (the called Trident II)

Aldridge

5 Jan 83

There is* a danger of nuclear war — initiated
by both — reflecting new characteristics of SC
nuclear and the character of our own, plus our
policies + strategies.

That danger is increased* by the MX —
and by Reagan policies (+ Carter's).

In fact — the real danger will commence with
(P and) MX — along with R. policies!

("Danger to MM" alone — the "wisdom of
vulnerability" — is spurious, — abuse of
US FS-cap and FS-policy!)

i.e., there is some danger — a crisis
(given R policies; and cap. of MM III with ME/RA):
' + Carter FU, + NATO...)

The spurious threat is being publicized
to bring the real threat into existence — the
latter, hardly discussed!

Motto of Weapons —

"We have nothing to fear but
lack of fear (confidence): this, or ours."

Airs controllers:

We have nothing to fear — except excess,
waste, too large numbers (here, excess chance of
accidents, and of "overkill.")

Rather: Wrong kinds of weapon & basing ^{+ plans, threats...} are
more dangerous (reckless, immoral; and for
current — unintentional — spiral
responses, seeing small (MNC) bits).

Airs are wrongful, reckless, immoral...
+ all new weapons are of this type!
(But new security, likely to remain the case!)

(over)
Powers: "Weapons threaten; they don't defend."

[cf. DEPT. OF TERROR* (INTIMIDATION)
(Ministry of Fear) (DEPT. OF DETERRANCE)]

* includes Counterinsurgency.)

SAC — Strategic Terrorist Command

(see Skantt / Reberch
on Sharon's

CF

34/83

Screen: 130-31

[It may be wrong to say — as I have — that "US must have superiority."

What US "must" have is a "superior nuclear-war-fighting cap" if the US strikes (executes) first."

(It would 'tolerate' parity in this — i.e. if the SU had a comparable FS cap, superior if it struck first;

though this is less preferred than US superiority in this regard: i.e. ^(best) a lack of CF/war-fighting cap by SU, or ^(c) ^{FS} a cap. inferior to the FS cap of US, or (b) an FS cap. inferior to US 2d-strike CF/OL cap (i.e. a FS cap. that worsens SU relative position).

Thus, it is what is "intolerable" to US is not parity per se, but "parity of MAD — ^{good} no CF on either side" (1967-1977), or worse, CF on SU side only, US "inferiority" (i.e. CF cap.) — alleged from 1977 on (Reple platform, 1980!; ignoring MM-II M124! + ASW).

[~~No — what is needed is not a device~~

Jan 17, 1983

CF/Prompter/Escalation

To prevent (otherwise likely "visible")
retaliation - in-kind (or "slightly higher,"
disparate, asymmetrical, perhaps experienced
as higher by writer though not intended by
attacker)

it is not enough to threaten
a feather, marginally greater, escalation,
"one-very-high" or "escalation ladder."

It is 'desirable', almost essential
(if one is to escalate, in hopes of
"prevailing" without evoking retaliation)
to threaten that retal. will be met,
or may be met, by a "greater leap,"
several ways higher, perhaps up to a
disarming CF attack, clever or "brutal."
(see HAK is '69: a savage blow...)

Jan 17, 1983

"Deterrence has worked"

- to maintain SU control of East Europe;
- to rule out US preemptive attack on SU (or, China)
- to inhibit our superpower from directly intervening in area in which the other was acting intervening (as rather less brutally or illegitimately):
 - this, e.g. VN, Laos, ~~the~~ Caribbean Korea, Taiwan
- perhaps, US control of ME
- US domination of West Eur (limited resistance by CP's)
 - (as to US intervention, corruption, "dirty tricks")
- allowed arising of West Germany!

Measure of "effect" is not:
(It does not seem necessary, or sufficient, in preventing SU or attack on US, or invasion of West Europe!)

(This was basis of NATO nuc plan,
until 1967!)

Cf. strategy for winning / threatening
"escalation game", "auctioning a dollar."
^{prop to}
- Bid 90¢ immediately, first bid,

or ~~2~~ - bid 10¢ and announce
that you will raise any subsequent
bid by, say, 50¢. (or just do so.)

If rules do not force the
"gradual escalation" has no definite
ceiling!

^{Preyer}
CPD "Threaten / prepare / plan" Big jump in
Escalation "so as not to have to do
it — and not to slide up into it, by
"gradualism," or (Gulles) by "failing to
make one will to do it clear in advance."

In particular, don't let SU have this cap, alone.
SS-20
SS-16

see my notes at the end

17, 1983

Has SC really opposed (whole-
heartedly, unequivocally, with high priority,
monolithically) the arms race?

Or does it seem some advantages —
enough to blunt its opposition,
encourage some imitation
& even escalation (SS-18's...)

(see K quarter;

lack of SC proposals to ban H,
or ~~prop~~ asant NEU

Underground test ban (abandoning insistence

Refusal of freeze, 1964

Quota of K, 1963!

Failure to oppose, strongly: — MIRV

— flight test for
seeing

Registration & control of depots MX

SS-20's...

JAN 17, 1983

"MAD"

It is not clear that "MAD" even
~~represented~~ a choice by the USG (or SU);
even by McN.

It described a state of affairs
that admitted of no alternative, 1965-77.

Forsey, Denver, 1982

SC 2 worried about CM as
effective FS weapons — coming in
undetected

Disappointed that Protocol to SALT-I
was not followed up — banning long-range
CMs.

Sous expressed great disappointment in this.

"Time is running out on our control.
No light at the end of the tunnel.

"Even if both sides maintained forces
for CF attacks, it was irresponsible of
USG to publicly proclaim such a strategy,
educating

Sous seems sad

But

Would they permit on-site inspection
in context of a total freeze?

Not very forthcoming or optimistic.

- Not willing to be up-front about the
areas of weakness/vulnerability - like
ASW - even though this could explain to
US public asymmetries that affect decisions
on land-based missiles.
- On the same improvement in accuracy.

They are in process of opening up SS-18s and
19s and inserting a new 200-lb guidance
system - This old accuracy was good enough
so this improvement cannot be applied other than
ASW & CF Cap. vs. US missiles.

RF asked whether SC would
announce a milestone on the guidance
package pending MX decision. But
people she talked to were simply not
informed or what was happening at the level
of detail.

Everyone for the Fringe: pro forma.

2 Highest officials:

One said:

Dubougin has said to Bernard Kanner
that they would accept it.

Pugwash meeting endorsed

Sov Union remains close to parity, closer
than any time since 19

If it comes to something by end 1983;
CM coming up; ENO active the point;
elections coming up (little action after
March 1984 — till ~ May 1985.

A Fringe in 1986-87 may not win
the support of SU.

"I don't think

"By an agent up in a bureaucracy
that perpetuates the same race.
Hard to imagine radical change as
possible, d

Sovs

(Plekhanov)

- CF cap. looks provocative, stimulates reaction,
even if it represents "parity"; ("you have it, too
and "D-C" / pre-emption. - at first!")
- So does doctrine + preparation for pre-emption.
- So does ^{prep. for} "non-nuclear offensive" (in West Europe) as best form of defense,
forces, deployment, maneuvers, doctrine...

(Have Russians relied on 'Weinberg doctrine' - "we
respond elaborate" (Cuba, El Salvador; Berlin, West Germany).

- So does SS-20 (just like missiles in Cuba; and IRBMs
in Turkey. How did SC like those?

Wf

- Thus,

aft. b

SU FS: When ANW did conceive this
as arising out of "crisis" (in
Europe, or elsewhere) ~~and~~, + fear of
US FS: "Domestic Balance," instability,
intervention to prompt)

- he did not look hard at
- the triggering events
(defense of US interests outside Europe?
against who, initially?
[local rebels: aided + encouraged
by SU?]
defense of SU interests in East Europe?
or of Africa - vs. Pakistan or Iran?
 - the reality of US FS posture, then.

On Duper:

check quotes: McGB: NFUS to
approve determine

Haig: we can't be limited.

42 - The risk of annihilation is clearly
not enough to prevent Presidents
~~to~~ from considering, making, committing
US to FU - with (at least) risk of
carrying out threats or probes, given
(risk of) opponents non-compliance -
even in rather "minor" crises.

It could hardly be ^{reliably} enough to prevent
preemption is a major crisis!

But ^{is} does "ability to prevail" ^(or does anything? prevent) guarantee
^{does} determine of preemption (given degrees of
"provailly") [Certainty of victory is ^{an "prevailing"}
unattainable - given ability of victor to "blackmail".

LOOK AT BARGAINING POWER OF PLO IN
WEST BEIRUT, JULY 1982! (Threat of losses to families
& Lebanese, + world condemnation)

Heck, 8201 1584 to Agre,

[ALL THIS FOLLOWS
FROM "ZERO-SUM"
ASSUMPTION.]

SA

Heck
in 820-21

Wrt. Vital: "Strategy is the
allocation of a budget."

(~~scarcer~~ ~~was~~ ~~more~~ ~~to~~ ~~alt.~~ ~~uses...~~)

— Robinson Crusoe strategy

(ignoring dynamic efforts on others —
and even one's own identity! —

e.g. of communication,

of affecting chains of argument,

of constraint, or lack of it.

on issue of (c) more production of Po/U-25; (b) H-bomb

[bst: if 'exploration' or addition (or use)
of "option" is cheap/free in terms of
resources [explor. of H; use of A!]

[text of ^AH] — "There is no decision
to be made."]

[Info, options, can't have negative values;
locking does nothing positive; likewise, only US has
constraint ("inimical") (exp for station); count...

(One can ignore: poss. of agreement;
(if one forgoes ruling or seeking
unilateral advantage); communication;
effects on foreign lines, future generations,
environment;

AND DECREE ^{one's}
also, poss. and to constrain leaders;
or future leaders; or "oneself..."
(esp. in pressure from others...)

(although Pres does say, often,
"not to commit" himself;
or "not to wear credibility..."

[Why does he? Why is he blind
to this?] unless Pres interfered with the decision
Hatch 320 that AEC/DOD would make on all this
HST to Ayres, Jan 31, 1949 the money: which he saw no reason
to do.

"Then actually was no decision to make on the
H. bomb. [i.e. "Why not?" "explain; no reason not to"]
(11) ? [even if A-bomb on Aug 6, 9!]

"SA Pres said this was really a question that was settled
in making up the budget for the AEC last fall when \$300M
was allotted." [i.e. with this large budget, (algebra) all agreed
that \$100M + PV was reasonable to allocate to exploration of H]

- / had to be able to "raise"
- for order to defer - so no need to
to carry out (see Fall)

Preparations

Compton - wants "tech. superior" 129
for same reasons as Ray & AF want
big forces in his

... Possession ... of atomic mil. power
will make its use unnecessary ... all police
world.

"We can be trusted with it. (and can
trust ourselves" - our heart on for
Compton, (Cherry) (128) Wilson (129)
168 207 Bush

235, 237 "Believing that American
leaders had encouraged Axis
ambitions in the '30's, states planners
thought that powerful mil. forces
could defer or subdue future
troubles.

[But see France, SC, Czech ...!
How solve & will preparation - "UAT/draft"
Times

Apr 82

(n

What if US went "down to rules" —
and SU acquired Trident II, MX, CM....

Unless US moved M.M., SU would have
a prompter cap = present;

(This now deters US escalatory threat in
Europe;

Why do not have an escalatory threat backed
by a FS threat (to deter US escalation — i.e. kind)
of kind US had till 1967 or so; nor has US
had it since then...

US cannot get back such a threat
— R's AIM — unless SU "quits, stands still."

ANTI-C³

(instead of 2 mobility; C.M.s; rules; LOW
BIG, "sprinkled" Downside weapons; anti-satellite;
/ threatened, none of them — except mobility,
anti-C³ — are entirely easy or likely

Thor - finite on FS weapons (accepted
by NATO Dec 57:)

Conflict: the mode of depicting an SU^{FS} threat so as
to get (FS) forces for the US - ostensibly for "defense"
vs. Pres' use of FS threats, and other
intention Berlin Clayson, how to tell K...

[DC at SAC in 1961

thelphatun speak

NIE '61 ...]

DC/Army '61

"Pre-emption"; "strat. warning";

in alert; QRA; delegation

as COVER

"We don't use preemption war
we don't assess."
"intentional"

- what is a "provocation"? (Caulfield)
- who decides - how?
- how was it set up/handled?
(TG)

Frenge

1. SU FS cap. now — (Forley)
at most (all SS-18's with Mod...) —
covers most of our land-based missiles —
i.e. $< \frac{1}{4}$ of our warheads —
just as US covers $\sim \frac{1}{4}$ of their warheads
with our ASW!

Later, we could "cover" "100%" of this, while
they could still cover only $\frac{1}{4}$ of ours!

(though they could still annihilate us with the
residual force!

This, they ~~the~~ would do best to stop now!
Even now reason the US has!

2. by inhibiting "production" — even though there is only a
risk — not a certainty — of big caught cheating on
small items — we attach a strong deterrent to such
production rather than encouraging them: while our
risk (if deterrent fails) is small, much smaller than
the risk involved in permitting production (esp. of large
items — missiles, planes.

It ~~seems~~ there is no way of making land-based
missiles invulnerable! other than eliminating MIRV, reducing numbers.

Peter Adair

6:30

1493

Carlingo Lts
Cdr. of Hook.

713-724-0251

David Rowley

Haines, Econ

PEJECT 1) Advantage of effort at preemption } damage-
or 2d-strike } hitting,
by CF (vs. "total withholding" effort to end war.
(Preemption surrender?!)

Have ^{give up} 2) eff effort to deter SU involvement in limited
conflict, or SU use, or SU counter to US use,
by "threat of instability" - US or SU
[even at cost of making such events marginally more likely]

- Look critically at the stakes involved in limited conflicts -
including :- stakes for whom?
- based on whole analysis? evidence?
- stakes for others threatened
- alternative means of protecting these interests...

* Hyp: Purpose of MX, etc. (or, "the only actual effort
in line with its stated or inferable aim") -

here, endorsed by the predictable SU counters

(COW, ... + by endorsed SU intentions to preempt
" " continued SU predilection to preempt
Phase I + US

MIRV - favors US (not incl!)

II - favors SU (")

MX/MIRV III - favors US (")

START: unders "window of vulnerability" for both, but more
for SU! (fewer ICBMs) (than without START)

DD

Paul

PS Plan, 1961?

1000 Discour photos in for alone

ICBM weapons not noted to members

Kaufman

; SU Air Defense didn't work.

Rosen

Kagan

Taylor

Trinkel

(Enthorn knew about it — but didn't get into it).

Nitze operator; "didn't like it."

why; didn't have that much info
on short- and ^{mid}-range